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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
separable4 4 and any attempt to separate them is a useless task. 45 In such a case
as this one, the single wrong done may be characterized as either negligence
or nuisance,46 and it does no harm if presented to the jury in only one aspect.
This situation is to be differentiated from one where the nuisance is an absolute
nuisance, involving the creation of obnoxious or hazardous conditions irrespec-
tive of negligence.
47
The majority also concluded that the plaintiff's "debris theory" was not sup-
ported by the evidence. The only witnesses to the accident were the occupants
of the car, who could not testify as to which direction the deceased pedestrian
was facing or walking. Even assuming the deceased had been on the north side-
walk, the debris did not render the sidewalk impassable48 and whether Morello
was forced off the sidewalk is mere speculation.
The dissent, while recognizing that the evidence was not overwhelming,
believed that a reasonable inference could be drawn as to why the deceased
crossed the street at the point of the accident. Mforello was expected home from
work at the time, and the location of his employment in relation to his home
suggests that he was crossing from the north side. Although the north sidewalk
was not impassable, it was hazardous because of chunks of dirt and stone.
Whether this debris forced the deceased into the road should have been decided
by the jury.
Courts are reluctant to make decisions on slight probabilities, but such
problems often arise where the victim is deceased. The liberal viewpoint of the
dissent seems to be the more practical in recognizing 49 this problem.
Liability of State for Absence of Highway Warning Signs
In Hicks v. State,"0 plaintiffs, occupants of two cars involved in a collision,
charged the state traffic commission with negligence in removing a "stop" sign
at the intersection of a state and county highway and replacing it with a standard
44. McNutty v. Ludwig & Co., 153 App.Div. 206, 213, 138 N.Y.Supp. 84, 90
(2d Dep't 1912).
45. Khoury v. County of Saratoga, 267 N.Y. 384, 389, 196 N.E. 299, 300
(1935).
46. McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 345, 160 N.E. 391,
392 (1928).
47. Ibid.
48. See O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930),
allowing plaintiff a recovery where the sidewalk was impassable.
49. In a death case, a plaintiff is not held to as high a degree of proof
of the cause of action as where an injured plaintiff can himself describe the oc-
currence. See Noseworthy v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 76, 80 N.E.2d 744
(1948).
50. 3 A.D.2d 106, 159 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't 1956); 4 N.Y.2d 1, 171 N.Y.S. 827
(1958).
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route marker ("N.L. 13 L-R")." 1 The Court held (5-2) that there was no negli-
gence on the part of the state contributing to the accident.
The decision of the Court is confusing as to whether it is based upon the
absence of negligence or the absence of causation. The Court held that had the
driver paid attention to the physical characteristics of the road and the signs
thereon she would have had "adequate" warning of the existence of the inter-
section. Inasmuch as the driver did not concern herself with these physical
characteristics nor with the information the route marker was designed to con-
vey, the majority felt that it could not be assumed that she would h .ve paid more
attention to a full "stop" sign had it been there.
The Court's reasoning on the question of causality appears faulty in that it
seems to assume a factual conclusion inconsistent with negligence on the part
of the state. If existing warnings were adequate, so as to require more caution
on the part of the driver, then the state was under no duty to maintain a "stop"
sign. And without negligence, a discussion of causality is irrelevant. Therefore it
is submitted that the decision must rest entirely upon the absence of negligence.
The position of the dissent was that the physical characteristics of the in-
tersection were an inadequate warning and the state therefore was negligent in
retmoving the "stop" sign. As to causality, the dissent relied upon a presumption
that a "stop" sign, had it been there, would have been obeyed5
2
Statutory Ltability Without Fault - Per Curiam
In Smulczeski v. City Center of Music and Drama,53 the defendant was
charged with violation of a city ordinance which provided, "Every portion of any
special occupancy structure devoted to the use or accommodation of the pub
lic... shall be properly lighted during every performance.. ." Plaintiff allegedly
tripped on a stairway because an overhead light was out. On appeal a lower
court verdict for the defendant was reversed on the ground that the instructions
to the jury contained an erroneous charge upon a material point. The Court held
that the defendant was not entitled to notiee of its violation and that a charge
contrary to this was not cured by a subsequent charge instructing the jury that
the duty imposed on the defendant by the ordinance was absolute.
The per curiam opinion appears inconsistent, both internally and with respect
to precedent. The traditional New York doctrine is that violation of a local ordin-
ance is only some evidence, to be considered along with other evidence, on the
51. See N. Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT §8.
52. Lahr v. Tirrill, 247 N.Y. 112, 8 N.E.2d 298 (1-937); Lee v. City Brewing
Corp., 279 N.Y. 380, 18 N.E.2d 628 (1939).
53. 3 N.Y.2d 498, 169 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
